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ichel Foucault’s first thoughts on power stemmed from a series of insights on 
psychiatry and the asylum.1 Surprising as it may seem, one of the concepts that can 
account for these first insights is largely neglected. In fact, ‘graft’ is not often associated with 
Foucault, let alone with any theory on madness. Yet Foucault uses it several times – if only 
between the lines. It is convenient to refer from the beginning to what I believe to be the most 
clarifying statement that concerns the practice of grafting and its relationship with madness:  
 
For this new reason which reigns in the asylum, madness does not represent 
the absolute form of contradiction, but instead a minority status, an aspect of 
itself that does not have the right to autonomy, and can live only grafted onto 
the world of reason.2 
 
In the present article, I wish to discuss the implications of using the practice of grafting in 




I shall start by answering a trivial question: what is commonly known as a graft? In botany 
different plants can be grafted to form new species. We take two different species and we 
form a new one. But when we extend the practice of grafting from botany to a conceptual – 
and possibly metaphorical – level, an uncanny implication emerges. The relationship between 
the two plants is not equal: if plant A is grafted onto plant B, it is the latter that gives 
everything that the new AB species will need to survive (nutrition, water...). If in botany graft 
is mainly an exchange and a creation, on a conceptual level it is also – and possibly above all 
– a relationship of power.  
When Foucault refers to madness as a graft onto the world of reason it is because this 
graft unveils a discrimination rather than defines a fusion, or, even better, it defines a fusion 
insofar as there is an original discrimination. In order to participate in the totality of the social 
                                                
1 This article was first presented as a paper on the occasion of the inaugural Skepsi conference Graft and 
Transplant: Identities in Question (24th May 2008, University of Kent, Canterbury). Thanks to Wissia Fiorucci 
(University of Kent), for her patient revision and support. Also many thanks to Dr. Lorenzo Chiesa (University 
of Kent), whose constant help and supervision motivated and guided my research. 
2 Michel Foucault, History of Madness (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 489. 
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body, madness has to be first discriminated, separated, marked as different, then grafted onto 
reason, from which, as a grafted plant, it gets all of its sustenance. Besides, the social body, 
for what concerns madness, seems to build its continuity through a graft.  
Therefore, madness lives in a subaltern state to reason, and the identity of madness is 
precisely what reason needs to exclude in order to define itself. Starting from this point of 
view, this article wishes to address how the identity of madness is affected by this subaltern 
position, by this graft, as it can be inferred from Foucault’s position. In fact, it is clear enough  
that, through his Histoire de la Folie, Foucault wished to let emerge the ‘unsaid’ conditions 
for such a graft. Thereby, on a first level of analysis I wish to focus on the social aspect of this 
graft and on the Foucauldian social identity of madness.          
This social identity is rooted on a conceptual graft that is enacted on each single 
individual. In this article I will articulate this subjective aspect of the graft through the shift 
between positivist psychiatry (where madness is understood as an organic dysfunction of 
man’s nature) and phenomenological psychiatry (where madness is considered as an 
alteration of man’s being-in-the-world). Briefly, I will consider mental illness as a device for 
the social graft: all the stigma associated with the social category of madmen, through 19th 
century positivist psychiatry, is grafted onto the very nature of the human being. In order to 
undo the effects of such a deep graft, phenomenological psychiatry enacts an opposed 
movement. That is to say, a sort of eidetic reduction (épochè) capable of restoring a more 
authentic relationship with sick subjects. 
Last but not least, I will show how, in the work of Franco Basaglia (1924-1980), the 
Italian anti-institutional psychiatrist, the two perspectives converge. On one side, Basaglia 
needs a therapeutic approach capable of recognising and fighting what was grafted onto the 
suffering human being: the image of madness as a disease, mingled with social prejudices 
such as danger and scandal; that is to say, a perspective capable of treating madness as a 
human condition, and madmen as human beings and subjects. On the other hand, according to 
Basaglia, the asylum has to be destroyed: the space in which madmen were confined, once 
fallen, allows them to return into society. The destruction of the physical space of the asylum 
is the destruction of the conceptual space from which madness was grafted onto the world of 
reason: the conditions of this graft no longer subsist, and madness is unconditionally allowed 
inside society. 
In substance, it seems that, in these three different perspectives, defining an identity of 
madness relies on a graft. What these perspectives tell us is that, if there is something like an 
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identity of madness, the strategy to conceptualise it has to undertake a movement of return: a 
return from a conceptual state and a physical space from which madness is grafted onto the 
world of reason. An unconditional return to a state to which madness may have – 
paradoxically – never belonged and to a space which it may have never inhabited. In this 
article, I wish to show how the concept of graft can account for both the traditional 
relationship between reason and unreason and also for the paradoxical movement of return 
that could subvert such a relationship. 
 
2. Michel Foucault on the asylum and positivist psychiatry 
 
Madness becoming a graft onto the world of reason is, according to Foucault, the birthmark of 
a form of repression and exclusion that was once associated with lepers. After the era of the 
great confinement, when madmen were associated indiscriminately with criminals, poor and 
indigents, after Pinel’s and Tuke’s moral treatment, madness is now to be secluded in a more 
sophisticated and specific place. In the asylum, under the cover of a new born medical science 
and in the name of public decorum, economic conditions produce an overlap in legal and 
medical powers aimed at containing social scandal and curing what was soon to be known as 
mental illness. 
Thus, madness shifts from extreme passion, animality and unreason to a disease, whose 
primary characteristic is not – as one would expect from an illness – a specific medical 
symptom, but its undefined liaisons with social dangerousness. Therefore, this shift forces 
madmen to become a minority inside society itself, defined only by the means of the ruling 
culture and in exact opposition to its moral dictates: the humanitarian act of dividing the sick 
from the criminals and freeing them from chains is certainly ‘not unreason liberated, but 
madness long since mastered.’3 
The age of the asylum created a specific space (both physical and conceptual) for 
madness. This space was soon delivered to the influence of what is commonly referred to as 
positivist psychiatry: a current stemming from Wilhelm Griesinger’s (1817-1868) definition 
of mental illness as a brain disease.4 Understood and treated only in medical terms, madness 
is grafted onto the very nature of human being, giving start to a peculiar form of naturalistic 
reductionism. Man, reduced to his nature, carries into his very being his dysfunction and is 
consequently treated as corrupted and dangerous in his own nature. On an individual level, 
                                                
3 Michel Foucault, History of Madness (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 489. 
4 Wilhelm Griesinger, Mental Pathology and Therapeutics (New York: Hafner Pub. Co, 1965). 
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this is the perfect device to enact the social graft: sick human beings, in becoming inmates of 
the asylum, are eradicated from society, secluded in a special space, delivered to the only ones 
able to deal with this new form of social dangerousness: physicians. Therefore, reason 
declines setting itself against an excluded background, negating its opposite and, eventually, 
grafting onto itself the uncomfortable burden of a huge minority, carefully guarded from sane 
eyes, and closely studied by the psychiatrists, its custodians. Henceforth, the identity of 
madness will depend entirely on the world of reason to be defined, to be spotted, to be 
confined and to be healed, and this is why Foucault can refer to it as a graft. 
 
3. Phenomenological psychiatry 
 
This twofold exclusion – from society and from reason – is what phenomenological 
psychiatry and the Italian work of psychiatric deinstitutionalisation aim at overcoming.  
In the wake of Husserl’s motto (‘To the things themselves!’), Karl Jaspers – who is 
regarded as the founder of phenomenological psychiatry – wrote his masterpiece (Allgemeine 
Psychopathologie, 1913), in order to appreciate and describe the subjective phenomena as 
experienced by the patients themselves. Jaspers’ aim was to overcome the positivist 
objectification of mental illness, which moved from the explanation of natural psychic 
phenomena, categorising them into pre-determined systems of symptoms and syndromes. In 
other words, positivist psychiatry’s categories refer to a priori models of health and illness, 
whereas Jaspers sought an a posteriori approach. 
To ‘go back to the things themselves’, for Jaspers, means to return to the immediate 
contact with the patient’s subjectivity, rather than cataloguing his symptoms into given 
organic categories. Clearly, such a contact has to proceed from a dialogue. What Freud 
debatably inaugurated, that is to say, an approach based on dialogue as opposed to external 
observation, is emphasised by the most renowned of Jaspers’ followers and one of the key 
influences of Basaglia’s thought: Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966). Psychiatrist and director 
of the Kreuzlingen sanatorium, Binswanger was the first to articulate Jaspers’ 
psychopathology with Heidegger’s existential analysis, thus creating a psychiatric research 
method known as Daseinsanalyse (or anthropological phenomenology). According to 
Binswanger, there are two ways of practising psychiatry: 
 
One leads away from ourselves toward theoretical determinations, i.e., to the 
perception, observation, and destruction of man in his actuality, with the aim 
in mind of scientifically constructing an adequate picture of him (an 
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apparatus, ‘reflex mechanism’, functional whole, etc.). The other leads ‘into 
ourself’, but not in the mode of analytic-psychology (which would again 
make us into objects), nor characterologically (which would objectify us 
with regard to our individual psychopathological ‘class’).5 
 
Avoiding any form of categorisation, his Daseinsanalyse was based on a completely 
equal relationship between the psychiatrist and the patient (he called it the ‘loving 
encounter’). This relationship relies entirely upon dialogue. As opposed to psychoanalysis – 
which in the patient’s words would have sought the emergence of a traumatic event – the 
Daseinsanalyse tried to rebuild the patient’s totality as a human being. 
In this context, mental illness is understood not as an organic dysfunction but as a 
modification of the patient’s being-in-the-world, or, in other terms, as a different modality of 
existence. Sane and insane inhabit the same world and share the same nature. Therefore, they 
are not any more divided by the walls of a positive science: madness and reason are then 
understood as different modes of being in such a common world. 
Clearly, the therapeutic outcomes of this position are at least very debatable, and the 
practical resonance of Binswanger’s theory belongs to a restricted niche. Moreover, he has 
never been able to overcome the general idea that ‘the essence of madness is the delirium, that 
is to say it is not an error or a series of errors but it is a completely mistaken relationship with 
the real.’6 On the contrary, he has possibly strengthened this concept. 
 
4. The épochè in psychiatry 
 
Yet, something very interesting emerges from both Jaspers and Binswanger, especially in 
their use of words: in fact, when they refer to this immediate contact with the patient, with the 
sick, they always seem to imply a return and not an act per se. It is a return because 
psychiatric perception is already corrupted by a priori categories, that in turn need to be 
bracketed to achieve such an immediate relationship with the patient. Although this operation 
resembles husserlian épochè, it is not until recently that this concept assumed a consistent role 
in psychiatry.  
Raymond McCall – psychologist and professor of philosophy of psychiatry – following 
Husserl, refers to different levels of eidetic reduction, or épochè, in psychiatry: one is the 
                                                
5 Ludwig Binswanger, ‘Freud's Conception of Man in the Light of Anthropology’, in Being-in-the-World. 
Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger, ed. by Jacob Needleman (New York and London: Basic Books, Inc, 
1962), p. 171. 
6 Michel Foucault, ’Le Supplice De La Vérité’, in Dits Et Ecrits, (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 331. Translated 
from the French by the author of this article. 
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bracketing of all the non-psychological elements of his investigation (such as behaviour, 
physical reality...). Another one is transcendental reduction, aimed at referring the subject 
only to his self-consciousness. The latter is the proper phenomenological reduction, which 
prompts ‘to overcome the illusions of perfect objectivity’. Only through these reductions the 
psychiatrist is able to access the patient’s subjectivity.7 
Conversely, Franco Basaglia gave épochè a central role in his entire work. Franco 
Basaglia is known for reforming Italian psychiatric health care, and especially for regulating 
compulsory hospitalisation and decreeing the closing of asylums, henceforth entrusting only 
small territorial centres with psychiatric health care. 
In Basaglia’s own words, all of his work was marked by the  
 
attempt to bracket mental illness as a definition and codification of 
unintelligible behaviours, in order to remove the super-structures given by 
institutional life and in order to identify in the process of destruction of the 
sick which part was played by the disease and which by the institution.8 
 
Far from considering mental illness entirely as a social product – as was the general anti-
psychiatric idea – Basaglia urges himself and his colleagues to abandon a priori categories in 
order to approach the sick in his subjectivity.  
It is in these acceptations that épochè is to be considered as the conceptual device of a de-
grafting. Mental illness, once grafted onto man’s nature, is returned through an épochè to the 
totality of human being, insofar as objectivity is sacrificed in order to appreciate the subject 
and his existence.  
 
5. Franco Basaglia and the paradoxical return of madness 
 
As we have seen, the social and the subjective perspectives converge in Franco Basaglia’s 
thought and work: the destruction of the asylum aims at deleting not only that physical space 
in which madmen were secluded, but also that metaphorical space from which madness could 
live only grafted onto the world of reason. Through the aforementioned épochè, on the one 
hand, madness is returned to the domain from which it was excluded (reason). On the other 
hand, free from objective categories, the psychiatrist is able to reach the totality of the 
patient’s subjectivity without reducing him to his nature. In Basaglia’s opinion, then, madmen 
                                                
7 Raymond J McCall, Phenomenological Psychology: An Introduction (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1983), pp. 56-59. 
8 Scritti (1953-1968). Dalla Psichiatria Fenomenologica All'esperienza Di Gorizia, ed. by Franca Ongaro 
Basaglia, (Torino: Einaudi, 1981), p. XXII. Translated from the Italian by the author of this article. 
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and society, on one side, and, on the other, psychiatrist and patient should recover an equal 
relationship, which is not based any more on a conceptual graft. 
Yet, it is a strange restitution, a strange recovery: there is not such moment in history 
during which madmen belonged to society, during which madness belonged to reason or 
during which there was an equal relationship between sane and insane. The paradox is clear to 
Basaglia, who made of the very concept of contradiction one of his key theoretical 
assumptions: 
 
To underline contradictions means to create the opening of a fracture. [...] In 
the time that elapses from the explosion of the contradiction and its covering 
(for nothing else can happen), an occasion is determined: that of a 
consciousness rising on the part of public opinion.9 
 
Therefore, keeping these contradictions open is the key element of Basaglia’s strategy. In 
order to deploy such a strategy, we need to unveil the devices that kept the contradictions of 
madness silent, one of which is the doppio della follia (the double of madness). This double – 
that is what society and medicine made of madness – is grafted onto madness itself, 
understood as a human condition, as subjective suffering, as a modality of existence. That is 
to say, on one side this double is a condition confused with public scandal, delinquency, 
indigence and on the other it is what remains of a message muted by the monologue of reason.  
 
6. De-grafting madness 
 
During one of his Brazilian Conferences, Basaglia said: 
 
I don’t know what madness is. It can be everything or nothing. It is a human 
condition. Inside us, madness exists and it is present in the same way as 
reason is. The problem is that society, in order to define itself as ‘civil’, 
should accept both reason and madness. Conversely, this society 
acknowledges madness as a part of reason, and reduces it to that reason as 
long as there is a science entrusted with its elimination. The asylum needs to 
exist as long as it makes the irrational become rational. When someone is 
mad and enters the asylum, he ceases to be mad to become ill. He becomes 
rational insofar as he is ill. The problem is to untie this knot, to overcome 
institutionalised madness and to recognise madness where it begins: in life.10 
 
To untie this knot – or should we call it ‘graft’? – means to destroy the asylum, the space 
where, marginalised and secluded, madness could live only as grafted onto the world of 
                                                
9 Franco Basaglia, ‘Conversazione: A Proposito Della Nuova Legge 180’, Scritti (1980), pp. 481-482. Translated 
from the Italian by the author of this article. 
10 Franco Basaglia, Conferenze Brasiliane (Milano: Cortina Raffaello, 2000), p. 28. Translated from the Italian 
by the author of this article. 
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reason. To abate the walls of this marginal space means to return madness to that society to 
which it always belonged but from which it was originally excluded.  
At the same time, mental illness as a category imposed by the dominating culture has to 
be de-grafted from madness as a human condition, in order to return madmen to their 
responsibility as human beings, because 
 
in our opinion, madness is life, tragedy, tension. It is something serious. 
Conversely, mental illness is the void, the ridiculous, the mystification of 
something that there is not, an a posteriori construction built in order to keep 
the irrational concealed. The only one allowed to speak is Reason, the reason 
of the fittest, the reason of the State and never that of the outcast, of the 
emarginated, of those who don’t have.11 
 
 In conclusion, these three different perspectives tell us that if there is something like an 
identity of madness it has then to be sought through a paradoxical return. It is a return to a 
time and space where it always belonged but where it has never been. For madness never did 
participate in the world of reason nor in the dominant social sphere. It did so only as that 
excluded, against which reason and society could set to define themselves in a negative 
fashion. In other words, madness never participated in the world of reason, except as a graft. 
Therefore, this paradoxical return requires an acknowledgement that madness inhabits 
everyday life as a graft, confined and controlled in a space (both physical and conceptual) 
from which it has to be de-grafted, if we want to let the long forsaken stultifera navis sail 
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